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ABSTRACT 
In this paper the hypothesis that foreign direct invest-
ment by multinational corporations in Brazil was beneficial 
for Brazi 1 · s economic development is being tested. This is 
done by examining the numerous different consequences of 
foreign direct investment in Brazil. It is looked at the 
effects of multinational activities on economic growth and 
employment, on the balance-of-payments. on distribution of 
income, and on the composition of gross domestic product. 
Furthermore, it is focussed on research and development 
activities of multinationals in Brazil; also the questions 
whether foreign direct investment contributed to the foreign 
indebtedness and to inflation are discussed. Finally, it is 
asked whether denationalization of the Brazilian economy 
occurred and whether there were political implications. 
Before presenting the empirical!~ evident consequences, 
there are three chapters which serve as a framework for the 
empirical part. First, terms used in this analysis are 
defined. Then a brief presentation of the Brazilian economic 
history fol lows. The third part consists of a theoretical 
discussion regarding the impact of foreign direct investment 
in less developed countries. The empirical analysis in the 
fourth chapter is followed by a conclusion. 
The consequences of foreign direct investment for Brazil 
are highly complex, but a brief summarization of the most 
important issues can be made. It becomes apparent that foreign 
direct investment relatively to total capital formation was 
rather small. Although industries with foreign dominance 
experienced above-average rates of growth, the impact on the 
economy from an overall perspective is rather insignificant. 
Also employment effects are small due to the relative magni-
tude of foreign direct investment and because of the use of 
labor saving technology. Multinationals do not contribute to 
a more equal distribution of income. The balance-of-payments 
of Brazil were affected positively and negatively by foreign 
direct investment. Multinationals contributed strongly to 
Brazil's export sector. On the other hand, capital goods and 
production inputs were imported by multinationals; further-
more, technology payments and profit remittances to the head 
corporation abroad caused foreign exchange outflows. Multina-
tionals avoid research and development activities in Brazil; 
advanced technology is available to domestic firms only via 
licensing. 
A clear answer to the original hypothesis cannot be made 
because there are convincing positive and negative arguments. 
Other less developed countries can benefit from Brazil's 
experience in that they emphasize positive effects and try to 
prevent negative aspects of multinational involvement. 
International organizations are often the best ones to set 
intelligent regulations in order to maximize the benefits from 
foreign direct investment for the developing host country. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The hypothesis of this paper is that foreign direct 
investment (FD I ) by multinational corporations (MNCs) in 
Brazil was, in balance, beneficial. This study does not only 
focus on purely economic implications but also on social and 
political consequences of multinational activities in the 
country. This is a systematic analysis of the impact of 
foreign direct investment in the Brazilian economy. 
Foreign direct investment is a very common way for under-
developed countries to increase their economic output, and 
many less developed countries (LDCs) have remarkable incentive 
programs to attract foreign investment. But is this the right 
strategy by which an LDC should develop its economy? Are the 
benefits in fact more significant than the economic, social 
and political costs? 
Industrialization by foreign direct investment is a 
controversial topic among economists. This study examines the 
main arguments for and against foreign direct investment by 
using an empirical case, the Brazilian Economy. Brazil is the 
country that, together with Mexico, has experienced the 
heaviest invo 1 vemen t of mu 1 tina ti on a 1 investment in Lat in 
America (Swift, 1978, p. 69) • Hence the Brazilian case 
provides an excellent opportunity to analyze the complex 
imp 1 i cations of foreign di re ct investment from a 1 ong-run 
perspective (1945-1980s). 
The current literature does not provide an analysis of 
this kind. Most of the literature on this subject considers 
the development problems of Latin American countries as a 
whole such as done by Swift (1978) when she analyzes the 
involvement of multinational corporations in addition to other 
development problems. On the other hand, there are papers 
which analyze specific implications of foreign direct invest-
ment in Braz i 1. Connor ( 1977) , for ex amp 1 e, examines the 
sources of market power of mu 1tinationa1 s in Braz i 1 . This 
paper differs from these mentioned above in that it tries to 
give a clear overview of the numerous, different empirical 
consequences of foreign direct investment in Brazil in one 
study. 
In order to make the phenomenon foreign direct invest-
ment in Brazil better understandable, there are three chap-
ters which serve as a framework for the empirical analysis. 
The paper first defines and clarifies the terms used. Second, 
it gives an overview of the Brazilian economy from a histori-
cal perspective to clarify foreign involvement in Brazil's 
development. Then a theoretical and general discussion follows 
concerning the phenomenon foreign direct investment in less 
developed countries first from the perspective of the multina-
tional corporation and then from the perspective of the 
developing host country in the form of a benefits-costs 
analysis. The fourth chapter is an empirical analysis of the 
most important implications of foreign direct investment in 
Brazil. And finally, the last chapter is a summary and 
interpretation of the evidence. 
The perceptions won from Brazil may be applicable else-
where when foreign direct investment is used to modernize an 
economy. In Eastern Europe, for example, a remarkable economic 
liberalization is taking place in which the governments are 
relying on foreign investment by western multinational corp-
orations. The governments expect strong economic growth and 
a higher standard of living from this investment but need to 
be prepared for many complex changes which will take place in 
their economies. Brazil's experience could be instructive to 
these nations and help increase the benefits and reduce the 
disadvantages of multinational involvement in their economies. 
CHAPTER I 
DEFINITIONS 
Before the actual study can begin, it is useful to define 
and clarify some of the terms used such as "multinational 
corporation" and "foreign direct investment". 
The Multinational Corporation 
A multinational corporation is a commercial institution 
which controls subsidiairies in several foreign countries. The 
control aspect of this definition refers to the power of the 
MNC to set strategies regarding different operations of the 
affiliates such as the choice of technology, price policies, 
the selection of personnel, and other important decisions 
(Frank, 1981, p. 8). Many economists consider a corporation 
"multinational" when it involves "the central control of a 
certain minimum number of foreign subsidiairies of substantial 
asset size and extent of geographical (cross-national) spread" 
(Connor, 1977, p. 4) . 1 
Generally, MNCs are very large organisations. In a study 
by Newfarmer and Mueller ( 1975), for example, the average 
asset size of 179 U.S.-Multinationals in manufacturing in 1972 
1 Aharoni (1972) suggested a minimum of five different 
countries of operations, Vernon (1971) six. 
1 
was 1.2 billion U.S. dollars and the mean employment was 
43, 000 workers. They of ten con tro 1 more assets than they 
actually own due to joint-ventures. 1 Finally, these companies 
have generated very complex structures of internal control and 
communication (Connor, 1977, pp. 9, 216). National corpora-
tions become "mu 1 tina ti on al" when they invest directly in 
foreign countries. This phenomenon is described in the next 
section. 
Foreign Direct Investment 
The term "foreign direct investment" generally describes 
a collective flow of both tangible and intangible assets and 
services to a foreign country. This "package of complementary 
inputs" to a foreign country includes all forms of capital: 
physical capital such as a production plant; financial capital 
in the form of equity capital and long-term funds; human 
capital such as technical or managerial services, and intang-
ible capital such as legal rights to patented or secret pro-
ducts (Connor, 1977, p. 8). 
"Direct investment" must be distinguished from the so-
called "portfolio investment" which is the acqusition of 
foreign securities without participation in management or 
1 They may hold not all, but a large share of the issued 
equities. 
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control. Portfolio investment is rather carried out by 
individuals through financial institutions than by corpora-
tions. Sometimes, for instance when acquisitions of equity 
capital without the desire to influence the company's strategy 
occur, it is hard to draw an exact line between the two forms 
of investment (Connor, 1977, pp. 216-217). In this study, 
however, on 1 y di re ct investment wi 11 be considered. After 
these definitions we now will present the Brazilian economy. 
CHAPTER II 
THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY 
The Country: An Overview 
Brazil is the eighth largest industrial economy in the 
non-communist world with a gross domestic product of US$ 226.4 
bn (1985). The country has the image of being rather poor in 
spite of one of the highest growth rates of gross domestic 
product for the last 30 years (Furtado, 1984, p. 1). Brazil's 
economy is both developed and underdeveloped. Brazi 1, for 
example, has its own satellite communication network and a 
fuel alcohol program introduced to make the country self 
sufficient in energy. At the same time there is evidence of 
some characteristics of a poor developing nation, like hunger, 
illiteracy, and high infant mortality (Asencio, 1988, p. 248). 
Brazil's economy is primarily based on market principles. 
Industrialization started relatively late after the great 
depression of the 1930s and intensified after World War II. 
During the industrialization, an enormous movement of the 
population away from rural to urban areas took place. With 
140 million people in 1987, Brazil's population is the sixth 
largest in the world and has a growth rate 2.5 percent per 
year (Fa 1 k, 1988) . 
With 3.27 million square miles, Brazil covers 47 percent 
of Latin America and is the fifth largest country in the 
world. Brazil is usually considered one of the richest coun-
4 
tries in natural resources. Its most significant reserves are 
iron ore and manganese. 1 One out of four trees in the world 
stands in Brazil and about 20 percent of the world's fresh 
water reserves are on Brazilian territory (Filho, 1988, p.84). 
Most of the energy supply is drawn from oil and hydroelectric-
i ty. Since fossi 1 fue 1 s are rather scarce, Braz i 1 provided 
on 1 y 20 percent of its fue 1 needs in the mid 1970s and 
depended on 1 arge imports of fue 1. In the 1980s, Braz i 1 
discovered several new oil reserves, and dependency on fuel 
imports may decrease (Baer, 1989, p. 6). The contribution of 
the industrial sector to GDP rose from 20 percent in 1947 to 
38 percent in the mid 1980s, and by 1986 half of the exports 
consisted of manufactured goods. Per capita income in 1986 was 
about US$ 2,000, but one has to take into consideration that 
the income distribution was highly concentrated in certain 
income groups and in a few regions of the country.~ 
Braz i 1 is high 1 y competitive in world markets in some 
industries such as steel, leather goods, textiles, coffee, and 
sugar. Brazil is ranked fifth in arms exportation in the 
world. It also exports airplanes, ships, automobiles and 
1 With ca. 35 million tons of iron ore, Brazil has about 
35 percent of the world's reserves; the manganese reserves are 
about 80 million tons. 
2 In 1983, 10 percent of the population received 46 
percent of the national income, whereas the lowest income 
group with 20 percent of the population received only 3.8 
percent of the income. On a reg ion a 1 basis, the income was 
highly concentrated in the South; much less was earned in the 
North-West of Brazil. 
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automobile parts, and, furthermore, it exports ethyl alcohol 
and alcohol technology (Asencio, 1988, p. 249). 
With an external debt of US$ 109 bn (in 1987), Brazil is 
high 1 y indebted. Two thirds of its debt 1 s owed to private 
banks in western industrialized countries. Brazil's foreign 
debt is about 30 percent of its GDP, but many other countries 
have much higher debt. One such country, for ex amp 1 e, 1 s 
Argentina with a debt of 54 percent of GDP (Baer, 1989, p.62). 
Not only does Brazil have extraordinary resources and economy, 
it has a unique economic history. 
Historical Perspective 
The historical development of the Brazilian economy can 
be roughly separated into a period before and a period after 
World War II. Pre-war Brazil is discussed in this section and 
the following section then focusses on the period of indus-
trialization following the war. 
The Pre-World War II Period 
In 1822, Brazil declared its independence from the 
Portuguese crown. After independence several of the Brazilian 
nineteenth century governments made attempts to stimulate 
6 
industrialization. 1 But there were two primary factors that 
counteracted these efforts. Before declaration of indepen-
dence, Brazil received its naval protection from Great 
Britain, which in turn was al lowed to market manufactured 
goods in Braz i 1 thereby discouraging domestic industry. A 
second factor which discouraged industrialization was govern-
ment reliance on import and export duties for revenue. This 
resulted in an "open door" policy toward imports of manufac-
tured goods, and Brazil lagged far behind North America and 
Europe in its industrialization process (Baer, 1989, p. 15). 
In order to pay for imports, Brazil exported almost exclu-
sively primary goods and grew increasingly dependent on them. 
By far the most important export article in the 19th 
century was coffee which served as engine of growth for Brazil 
(See Table 1). By the late 19th century and early 20th 
century, the exportation of rubber replaced coffee as the 
primary export. During the first decade of the 20th century, 
Brazil supplied 90 percent of the world's rubber by exporting 
35,000 tons per year which was about six times as much as 
exported in the 1870s. Rubber accounted for 40 percent of 
Brazil's exports. 
1 Several times an increase in productivity by technology 
imports was tried. The financial sector was supposed to be 
modernized by the foundation of the Banco do Brasil (Bank of 
Brazi 1), which acted as a central and commercial bank, and 
later by the establishment of a stock exchange. 
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Table 1 
Coffee Exports in the 19th Century: 
Exports in 1,000 bags, 
Year each of 60 kg 
1821-30 3,178 
1831-40 10,430 
1841-50 18,367 
1851-60 27,339 
1861-70 29' 103 
1871-80 32,509 
1881-90 51,631 
Note: From The Brazilian Economy (p. 16) by W. Baer, 1989, 
New York. 
The boom, however, ended in the second decade of the 20th 
century when the Brazilian rubber producers were not able to 
compete anymore with cheaper rubber produced in Asia (Baer, 
1989, p. 16). 1 Let us look now at the industrialization of 
Brazil. 
After the abolition of slavery in 1888, immigration into 
Brazil increased significantly. Among the immigrants were many 
economically ambitious people who stimulated the growth of the 
l Other but much less significant exports were sugar, 
cotton and cocoa. 
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industrial sector. But it took almost four decades until 
industry became the leading growth sector in the economy. 
Despite increases in industrial output, the fastest growing 
area was the exportation of agricultural goods. There were no 
drastic s tructura 1 changes in this pat tern un ti 1 the 1 ate 
1920s. 1 
The great depression that began in 1929 served as a 
catalyst to boost industrialization. Declining coffee exports 
to the industria 1 i zed countries decreased foreign exchange 
earnings and thus the ability to import manufactured goods. 
This decrease in imports of manufactured products provided an 
opportunity for the development of domestic industry (Baer, 
1989, p. 37) . Thus in the 1930s, the manufacturing sector 
experienced very high growth rates and became the leading 
sector for the first time. At the end of the 1930s, Brazil 
supplied 80 percent of its intermediate goods, half of its 
investment goods, and in consumer goods it was close to self 
sufficiency (Baer, 1989, pp. 32, 40-41). 
1 Baer (1989) distinguishes between 'industrialization' 
and ' indus tr ia 1 growth· . Indus tr ia 1 i za ti on resu 1 ts in substan-
tial structural change in the economy that is not necessari-
ly the case with merely growth of the industrial sector. 
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The Post-World War II Industrialization Drive 
From WW II to the 1980s Brazil experienced remarkable 
industrialization. This period can be divided into three 
distinct subperiods by its external policy. In the first 
subperiod from the late 1940s until the early 1960s, a policy 
of import-substitution industrialization (ISI) was followed. 
From 1962 to 1973 some movement away from ISI took place, 
however, and policies to deal with the imbalances and distor-
tions that had arisen during the period of intense ISI were 
applied. The latter part of this subperiod was a strong boom. 
Since 1974 adjustment to the oil shock in 1973 was a major 
focus with new emphasis on ISI. In this subperiod, a search 
for secure supplies of raw materials was also a goverment 
policy. Let us look first at the import-substitution indus-
trialization period that began after WW II. 
Import-Substitution Industrialization (1946-1961) 
During World War II Brazil accumulated substantial 
foreign exchange reserves. This encouraged the post war 
government, in which traditional free traders were in control, 
to lift all trade and exchange barriers. What followed was an 
import spree, and the country soon ran out of foreign exchange 
reserves (Baer, 1989, p. 197). In 1947 the old trade and 
10 
payment restrictions were reimposed in order to cope with 
balance-of-payments difficulties. The reimposed restrictions 
provided an incentive to foreign firms to invest in the 
protected country in order to secure their market shares 
(Connor, 1977, pp. 62-63). 
But there were more important reasons for fundamental 
changes in external economic policy. It became clear that the 
government had to support the country's industrialization in 
order to participate in the growing wealth of the developed 
countries (Swift, 1978, p. 58). 
It was argued, furthermore, that recessions in the devel-
oped countries would bring large declines in export earnings 
of primary products so that continued reliance on development 
efforts in the export sector was questioned. The most formal 
statement of this position came in 1950 from Raul Prebisch, 
an Argentine economist, who was director general of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. He stressed the 
necessity for the South American countries to industrialize. 
His main argument was that there occurs deterioration in the 
net barter terms-of-trade of LDCs that rely on exports of 
primary products (Tancer, 1976, p. 34). 1 
Like most Latin American countries, Brazil employed a new 
1 Raul Prebisch: "The low income elasticity of demand for 
primary products together with the high income elasticity of 
demand for industrial products means that the terms-of-trade 
for the Latin American countries are deteriorating and the 
benefits from trade are only being received by the industrial-
ized nations." (Swift, 1978, p. 58). 
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strategy in the period following WW II, import-substitution 
industrialization ( ISi). The ultimate goal of ISi was to 
manufacture products which had been previously imported and 
thereby stimulate industrialization and also decrease the 
demand for foreign ex change. Machinery for IS I was to be 
imported from the developed countries, purchased by either 
local firms or the government or through direct investment by 
international enterprise (Swift, 1978, p. 61). 
In order to promote foreign direct investment, the 
government implemented several policies in the early 1950s. 
It restricted the importation of consumer goods by setting up 
a tariff wa 11 around the country. The effective rate of 
protection was as high as 250 percent for some manufactured 
goods. This strategy became known as the "Law of Si.mi,lar-.s" . 1 
Additional incentives for multinational corporations to invest 
was created by temporary tax exemptions ("tax holidays") as 
well as investment credits and other subsidies (Connor, 1977, 
pp. 220' 236) • 
All in all, policies toward foreign capital were extreme-
ly favorable, creating the reputation for Brazil of being wide 
open to foreign investment. Even today, f 1 ows of business 
funds are relatively unhindered; multinationals consider the 
1 "The operation of the 1 aw of simi 1 ars has been the most· 
powerful incentive for foreign investors to move from import-
ing to assembly, or from assembly ·into full fledged manu-
facturing. The essential feature of this incentive has been 
fear of outright exclusion from the market rather than hope 
for preferential treatment in relation to competitors." (Baer, 
1989. p. 61 ) . 
12 
risk of expropriation low; and, in general, a capitalist 
development strategy is favored (Swift, 1978, p. 61). 
In order to make importation of machiner-y cheaper for 
domestic firms, the government introduced a new exchange rate 
system whose most important aspect was the over-valuation of 
the domestic currency. This over-valuation, howeve~.' .. had two 
other consequences: it discouraged exports and it limited the 
amount of capital goods imports due to balance-of-pay~ents 
restr-ictions. In addition, the inflow of foreign investment 
was hampered by the high external value of the currency 
(Swift, 1978, p. 63). 
In 1955 the government allowed the importation of capital 
equipment by foreign firms at tariff levels below those 
imposed on domestic firms. 1 These policies had a strong posi-
tive influence on the investment activities of multinationals 
(Newfarmer and Mueller, 1975, p. 97). 
In 1953 the National Bank of Economic Development was 
established. Its purpose was to support planning efforts and 
to analyze and to finance the infrastructure such as railroads 
and energy. The National Bank of Economic Development coopera-
ted with the Economic Commission for Latin America in system-
atic overall planning, particularly of technical matters 
(Baer, 1989, pp. 63-64). 
In 1956 Juscelino Kubitschek took the office of pr-esi-
1 Foreign companies could import capital goods at 45 
percent below the tariff level. 
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dent. He founded a National Development Council which in turn 
soon introduced an economic plan, the Programa de Netas ( prog-
ram of targets). It was not a general development plan, but 
it emphasized the support of important sectors, both in 
government and in the private economy. These areas were 
energy, transportation, food, basic industry, and education 
particularly in technical fields. The Development Council 
fol lowed the basic recommendations of the joint commission 
(Baer, 1989, p. 64). 
The Development Council implemented incentive programs 
in specific industries. The one stimulating the automotive 
industry was the most successful program and was directed by 
the "Executive Group for the Automotive Industry". This 
program supported the importation of automobile manufacturing 
equipment for a certain number of years. In order to receive 
the benefits, the firms committed themselves to replace 
progressively the imported components in automobiles manufac-
tu red in Braz i 1 . 1 Simi 1 ar import-supporting programs were 
established in the shipbuilding sector, machinery, tractors, 
and telephone equipment industries (Baer, 1989, p. 64). 
The !SI-strategy had a considerable impact on the econo-
mic structure of Brazil. Between 1947 and 1961, the industrial 
sector grew by 9.6 percent annually and during the years of 
1 Since the au tomobi 1 e industry was c 1 assi f ied as a 
"basic industry", it not only enjoyed special treatment 
regarding the importation of production equipment but was also 
subject to financial assistance by local authorities. 
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the Kubitschek administration from 1956 to 1960, 12.7 percent 
annually. During this period when the domestic product grew 
by 5.8 percent per year, agriculture was responsible for only 
18 percent of the absolute increases in GDP (Newfarmer and 
Mueller, 1975, pp. 96-97). Hence, industry becam~ __ by far the 
- --·- - --~~ ......... -, .. -,.,,.-~· .. ··-· ~-,. ·-· 
most dynamic sector in the Brazilian economy. 
The goal of the ISI-strategy was not only to industria-
lize but to diminish the importation of manufactured products. 
To clarify the consequences of import substitution, the amount 
of imports as a percentage of total GDP will be used. The 
import/GDP ratio declined significantly between 1949 and 1965, 
when over the same period the share of manufactured goods in 
total imports decreased from 81 percent (1949) to 68 percent 
(1962). This decrease was attributable not only to the import 
substitution program, but was a consequence of higher coal and 
petroleum imports. By increasing their share in total imports, 
the share of manufactured imports became relatively smaller 
(Baer, 1989, p. 66). 
The employment structure also changed during these years. 
The most pronounced growth was notable in the key ISI-indus-
tries such as transport equipment or machinery whereas tradi-
tional sectors experienced declines in their relative posi-
tions (See Table 2) (Baer, 1989, p. 72). 
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Table 2 
Changes in Brazil's Industrial Employment Structure 
Percentages in Total 
Employment 
Sector 1950 1960 
Metal Products 7. 9"/. 10. 21. 
Machinery 1.9"/. 3. 3"/. 
Electrical Equipment 1.1"/. 3. 01. 
Transport Equipment 1. 3"/. 4. 3"/. 
Textiles 27.4"/. 20.6"/. 
Food Products 18. 5"/. 15.3/. 
Beverages 2. 9"/. 2. l "/. 
Note: From The Brazilian Economoy (p. 72} by W. Baer, 1989, 
New York. 
The rapid industrialization resulted also in several 
disadvantages for the country. The economic growth was 
financed by a substantial inflow of foreign capital, direct 
foreign investment, and foreign loans by governments or 
international organisations. Later these foreign loans caused 
severe problems in the balance-of-payments because amortiza-
ti on and interest pay men ts increased to dangerous 1eve1 s 
(Baer, 1989, p. 73} . 
Unfortunately, the education system was neglected which 
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restricted access to the benefits of the industrialization to 
a large segment of the population. An unequal distribution of 
gains from industr ia 1 i za ti on occurred on a reg ion a 1, sec-
toral, and income group basis, and resulted in considerable 
threat to cohesiveness of society (Baer, 1989, p. 73). The 
consequences attributable to foreign direct investment will 
be discussed in the fourth chapter. 
Stagnation and Boom (1962-1973) 
The ISI-strategy used in the 1950s caused several 
difficulties. In the early 1960s Brazil had balance-of-
payments problems and high inflation rates. 1 The attitude 
toward foreign capital began to change due to a fear of 
increasing dependency on foreign investors ( Newfarmer and 
Mue 11 er, 1975, p. 98) . After the resi gna ti on of President 
Quadros in August 1961, Brazil fell into a political crisis. 
Due to a lack of leadership by the new president Goulart and 
unclear lines of authority between president and parliament 
after a modification of the constitution, the government did 
not follow a specific economic strategy. This made it very 
difficult for the authorities to cope with economic problems 
(Baer, 1989, pp. 76-77). 
1 The inflation rate in the early 1960s was between 50 
and 100 percent. 
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The balance-of-payments problems mentioned above were 
attributed to lack of exports and to debt service payments 
abroad. During the years of intense industrialization, export 
promotion and diversification had been completely neglected. 
In the early 1960s, about 90 percent of the exports were 
primary goods, and only 2 percent of the exports were manufac-
tured products. Some I SI-po 1 i cies even worked against the 
expansion of the export sector. For instance, the o.vervalua-
tion of the exchange rate discouraged exports due to higher 
prices of Brazilian products abroad (Baer, 1989, p. 198). 
At the same time outflows of funds for profit repatria-
tion and royalties were greater than investment inflows 
thereby worsening the foreign exchange shortage. Some groups 
in Brazil assumed more nationalistic policies toward multi-
nationals because they feared growing dependency on foreign 
capital or even domination of the country by foreign inter-
ests (Connor, 1977, p. 63). 
High inflation in the early 1960s was due to several fac-
tors. The massive government expenditures into the infra-
structure and other projects went far beyond the economy· s 
capabi 1 i ty to supp 1 y the goods needed for these projects. 
Rising prices and the resulting reduction in real tax revenues 
were followed by a monetary expansion which in turn accelera-
ted the inflationary pressure. The highly traditional agricul-
tural sector was not able to provide the growing urban 
popu 1 a ti on with sufficient food. This shortage occurred in 
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spite of an expansion of the agricultural sector in the 1950s 
at growth rates just ahead of the population increase. Food 
shortage in urban centers was exacerbated by a lack of 
appropriate transportation facilities from rural areas to the 
cities. The shortage drove up prices of food products (New-
farmer and Mueller, 1975, p. 98). 
Non-orthodox critics complained about the ISI-strategy 
as a whole. They argued that industrialization did not resolve 
the socio-economic problems of Brazil. It didn't correct the 
unequal distribution of income; it failed to correct the back-
wardness of the agricultural sector; it did not provide 
adequate employment opportunities for the rapidly growing 
urban population (Baer, 1989, p. 78). In order to deal with 
these problems, the government established a law in October 
1962 that severely limited profit remittances by multinatio-
nals. The government also initiated a 3--year plan to control 
inflation and to deal with the imbalances of the economy. The 
result of this "leftist stabilization program" was that direct 
investment by foreign firms decreased thereby agravating the 
balance-of-payments difficulties. Foreign direct investment 
in 1962 amounted to only US$ 9 million whereas the annual ave-
rage from 1958 to 1961 was US$ 110 million (Newfarmer and 
Mue 11 er, p. 98) . 
In early 1964 the crjsis reached a peak. Brazil experi-
enced foreign exchange shortages needed to pay the interna-
tional debt. It also experienced a negative growth of per 
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capita income, and inflation accelerated to nearly 100 percent 
per year. As a consequence, in Apr i 1 of the same year a 
military coup took place. In order to increase economic growth 
and to support the exportation of goods, the new government 
abolished the taxation of exports and replaced it by a program 
of export tax incentives. It established a program of credits 
to exporters and simplified the administrative procedures for 
exports (Baer, 1989, p. 198). The new strategy included 
aggressive attraction of both official and private loans and 
direct investment by foreign companies. Inflation was con-
trolled by !imitating the money growth, by reducing government 
expenditures, and by a freeze on the minimum wage (Newfarmer 
and Mueller, 1975, p. 98). 
These policies had little immediate impact. The reces-
sion continued, but it was now coupled with high unemployment 
which was due to the austerity program. 1 Inflation was reduced 
to 40 percent per year, and the balance-of-payments difficul-
ties continued to a lesser degree. During the period from 1965 
to 1967, foreign direct investment more than tripled. 2 
The remaining foreign exchange shortages were more than 
covered by foreign loans which rose from a yearly average of 
US$ 140 mil lion in 1962/63 first to an average of US$ 289 
million in the two years after the military coup and then to 
1 The per-capita growth rate between 1964 and 1967 was 
only 0.7 percent on an annual basis. 
2 From an average of 22 million US dollars in 1962 to 
1964 to an average of 73 million US dollars from 1965 to 1967. 
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an average of US$ 604 million per year in 1965-69 (Newfarmer 
and 1'1ue 11 er, 1975, p. 99) . Foreign ex change reserves grew 
steadily from US$ 219 million in 1963 to US$ 6.417 billion in 
1973. 
The economic stagnation lasted until 1968 when Brazil 
started its remarkable 7-year expansion period. Real GDP grew 
at an average rate of 10.9 percent between 1968 and 1974, 
compared to on 1 y 3. 7 percent between 1962 and 196 7 (Baer, 
1989, p. 80) (See Table 3). 
Table 3 
Real Growth Rates of Gross Domestic Product and Rates of 
Inflation (1968-1985, in percentages) 
Year GDP Gen. Price Index 
1968 11. 2% 25. 5% 
1969 10 .O'l. 21. 4% 
1970 8. 8% 19 . 8% 
1971 12.0'l. 18.7% 
1972 11.l'l. 16 .8% 
1973 13. 6% 16.2% 
1974 9. 7% 33. 8% 
1975 5. 4% 30. 1 'l. 
1976 9 . 71. 48. 2% 
1977 5. 7% 38. 6% 
1978 5. 0% 40.51.. 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Year GDP Gen. Price Index 
1979 6.41.. 76.8/. 
1980 7.21. 110. 2/. 
1981 -1. 6/. 95.2/. 
1982 0.9/. 99.7/. 
1983 -3.2/. 211.0/. 
1984 4.51.. 223.8/. 
1985 8. 3/. 235. l'l. 
Note: From The Brazilian Economy (p. 101) by W. Baer, 1989, 
New York. 
The economy grew rapid 1 y in part because between 196 7 
and 1972 the stock of foreign investment almost doubled from 
US$ 3.7 billion to US$ 7 billion; seventy percent went to the 
manufacturing sector. Almost 75 percent of the investment was 
made by companies from the United States (36 percent), Canada 
(17 percent), West Germany (14 percent), and France (7 per-
cent). From the 1960s on the role of multinationals became 
crucial for the growth of Brazil's industrial sector (Connor, 
1977, p. 65). 
The outward-oriented strategy after 1964 caused both 
imports and exports to grow steadily. Particularly in the 
period from 1970 to 1973, foreign trade grew at rates even 
higher than the economy as a whole. Exports grew at an average 
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of 14.7 percent per year while imports grew at 21 percent per 
year. The ratio imports to GDP fell from 16 percent in 1947-
1949 to 5. 4 percent in 1964 and then increased back to 14 
percent in 1974 (Baer, 1989, pp. 84, 86). 
Despite this remarkable boom, the benefits were not 
evenly distributed. Income became even more concentrated. In 
1960, the top 5 percent received 27.4 percent of the income, 
whereas the lowest 40 percent earned only 11.2 percent. In 
1970, the former group s share grew to 36. 6 percent, the 
latter group's decreased to 9.0 percent. Another indicator of 
the growing concentration of income was that between 1960 and 
1970 the real wages of urban workers declined almost 30 
percent whereas the per capita income of the top 5 percent 
increased by nearly 80 percent (Swift, 1978, p. 76; and Baer, 
1989, pp. 86-87). 
The infrastructure was still not well developed. Only 40 
percent of the households in the urban areas had access to the 
general water supply system, 53 percent had electricity, and 
only 5 percent of these households had telephones (Baer, 1989, 
p. 88) . 
"While Brazil's real economic growth averaged 9.8 percent in 
the last four years, the boom has had practically no impact 
at all on well over half the country's 95 million citizens. 
In fact, millions are actually poorer than 5 years ago." 
(The Wall Street Journal, April 21, 1972). 
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From the Oil-Shock to the Debt Crisis (1974-1984) 
After six "mi r-ac 1 e years" during which rea 1 GDP grelf-J 
r-apidly and inflation fell to its lowest level since the 
1950s, Brazil suddenly faced a fourfold incr-ease in the pr-ice 
of petroleum. This oil shock had an important significance for 
the Braz i 1 ian economy because four fifths of domestic oi 1 
consumption was imported. Between 1973 and 1974, the import 
bill grew fr-om US$ 6.2 bn to US$ 12.6 bn.l. As a response 
Brazil could either establish an auster-ity adjustment program 
or- it could opt for continued high gr-owth rates hoping it 
could pay for imports by growing. 
The new administr-ation of President Geisel, which took 
office in March 1974, stressed the unacceptability of stag-
nation and chose the second alternative. Geisel's goals wer-e 
continua ti on of economic growth, a better- di str i but ion of 
income, and political decompr-ession. 2 
In 1975 the Geisel administr-ation introduced the so 
cal led "Second National Development Plan" (PND I I) which 
consisted of huge investment pr-ogr-ams. Its goals were the 
import substitution of r-aw materials and capital goods, and 
rapid expansion of the infrastructure, particularly hydr-o and 
l. In the same period of time the cur-rent account deficit 
increased from US$ 1.7 bn to US$ 7.1 bn. 
2 It should be mentioned that in despite of the "miracle 
years" the income distribution in 1974 was still very highly 
concentrated and the population still suffered from political 
oppression before 1974. 
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nuclear power, transportation, and communication. Since these 
investments were considered too capital intensive for private 
enterprise, many of them were financed by the state. Private 
investment. however, received massive support from the Brazil-
ian Development Bank. The PND II had the following purposes: 
to maintain a reasonable economic growth rate and to decrease 
the unemployment rate; to act as a countercyclical policy 
against the oil shock; to change the structure of the economy 
through import substitution, export diversification and expan-
sion and thereby save foreign exchange; to encourage interna-
tional help in financing the current account deficit and to 
postpone external adjustment. For the rest of 1970s the real 
GDP growth rate remained at an average of 7 percent per year. 1 
In 1977 import substitution became notable and the import-
domestic production ratio began to decrease (See Table 4). 
Since Brazil was not able to pay the higher oil bill and 
to finance the huge investment programs at the same time, its 
foreign indebtedness increased dra~atically. The curr~nt ac-
count deficit rose from US$ 1.688 bn in 1973 to US$ 12.807 bn 
in 1980. The net debt, gross debt minus foreign reserves, went 
up from US$ 6.2 bn in 1974 to US$ 24.8 bn in 1978 (See Table 
5) • 
i. See Table 3. 
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Table 4 
Import/Domestic Production Ratios (1975-1980) 
Sector 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Intermediate Goods 
Cellulose 0 .10 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 
Polyethylene 0.34 0.72 0.38 0.45 0 .15 0.03 
Steel 0.33 0 .15 0.09 0.06 0.03 0.03 
Aluminium 0.68 0.58 0.62 0.45 0.37 0.26 
Capital Goods 0.65 0.64 0.46 0.55 0.37 0.49 
Note: From The Brazilian Economy (p. 104) by W. Baer, 1989, 
New York. 
In the same period the annual inflation rate was between 
30 percent and 48 percent per year. 1 In March 1979 General 
Figueiredo took office as president. He wanted to lead Brazil 
to a completely democratic regime, but the economy was in 
crisis. His administration was confronted with the dilemma of 
how to cope with the high inf 1 a ti on rate and achieve a 
reasonable growth of the real GDP. 2 
1 See Table 3. 
~ Because of droughts and f1osts the agricultural output 
in 1978 and 1979 decreased dramatically. The scarcity of agri-
cultural products caused additional inflationary pressure. 
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Table 5 
Brazil's Foreign Gross Debt, Net Interest, and Net Debt (1972-
1985, in millions of US$) 
Gross Net Net 
Year Debt Interest Debt 
1972 9,521 489 4,899 
1973 12,572 840 5,338 
1974 17,166 1,370 6, 156 
1975 21,171 1,804 11,897 
1976 25,985 2,039 17,150 
1977 32,037 2,462 19,441 
1978 43,511 3,342 24,781 
1979 49,904 5,348 31,616 
1980 53,848 7,457 40,215 
1981 61,411 10,305 46,935 
1982 69,653 12,551 65,659 
1983 81,319 10,263 76,756 
1984 91,091 11,449 79,096 
1985 95,857 11,239 81,452 
Note: Net debt is equal to gross debt minus international 
reserves. From The Braz i 1 ian Economy ( p. 106) by W. Baer, 
1989, New York. 
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Servicing of the international debt through amortization 
and interest took two thirds of the export earn in gs. In 
addition, world interest rates began to rise and costs of 
further borrowing became more expensive. The higher interest 
rates also increased the costs of paying the debt since most 
of the debt was contracted on a flexible interest rate basis. 
The Brazilian government came under international pressure, 
furthermore, to remove its fiscal and credit subsidies to its 
exports. Finally a second oil shock in 1979 caused a drastic 
decline of the terms of trade (World Bank, 1984, p. 5). 
In December 1979, the government introduced an "econo-
mic package" whose most important parts were a "maxi" deval-
uation of the cruzeiro by 30 percent (later 45 percent) to 
remove its overvaluation; elimination of export subsidies and 
of many tax incentives; increase in public service prices; and 
a program to encourage external lending to Brazil. 1 
The deva 1 uation of the cruzei ro and the increase in 
public services prices had an immediate inflationary impact. 
The administration, however, expected the inflation rate to 
decline in the long run because increased government revenues 
would stop monetary expansion. In the first months of 1980, 
it became clear that the inflation rate would be higher than 
100 percent for the whole year. In order to stop rising 
1 The rate of inflation was higher than the the mini de-
valuations of the cruzeiro. An overevaluation, however, would 
jeopardize the competitiveness of Brazil's exports and lift 
protection from domestic industries. 
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prices, the administration decided to keep credit expansion 
to 45 percent for the entire year. Public expenditures were 
drastically reduced and investment of state enterprises 
decreased by 8 percent. By the end of 1980 most of the policy 
measures introduced in 1979 were reversed or replaced. 
In 1980 the real GDP grew at a surprisingly high growth 
rate of 7.2 percent despite an inflation rate of 110 percent 
per year. 1 Between 1979 and 1980, the gross debt increased 
from US$ 49.9 bn to US$ 53.8 bn. At the same time the inter-
national reserves declined from US$ 9.7 bn to US$ 6.9 bn 
(Baer, 1989, pp. 112-113). 
Since it became increasingly difficult to finance the 
external debt, the government decided in the second half of 
1980 to change radically its macroeconomic policy. In order 
to decrease the domestic demand and hopefully make exports 
more attractive, the government introduced a restrictive 
monetary policy. Furthermore, the administration established 
several other measures to decrease the aggregate demand and 
to reallocate resources to the priority sectors, agriculture 
and exports. 4 The result was a recession in 1981, when gross 
domestic product declined by 1.6 percent and the industrial 
sector by 5.5 percent. The external debt problem was not 
1 One has to take into account the recovery of the agri-
cultural sector and its contribution to the growth rate. 
4 The measures included a decrease in public investment, 
and the elimination of indexing. In addition, the government 
freed the prices of previously controlled industrial sectors. 
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solved. On the contrary, interest and amortization payments 
reached 83 percent of export earnings in 1982 (See Table 6). 
Table 6 
Foreign Debt Service/Export Ratios (1972-1985) 
Debt Service/ Interest Payments/ 
Year Exports Ratio Exports Ratio 
1972 35.8 8.2 
1973 32.7 7.7 
1974 29.8 7.5 
1975 37.9 15.9 
1976 44.2 16.7 
1977 47.3 16.2 
1978 58.8 19.8 
1979 63.3 25.1 
1980 51.8 28.9 
1981 61.0 35.9 
1982 83.3 51.6 
1983 78.5 40.4 
1984 66.3 42.2 
1985 75.8 43.1 
Note: Debt service includes interest and amortization. From 
The Brazilian Economy (p. 115) by W. Baer, 1989, New York. 
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The inflation rate went from 95.2 percent in 1981 to 99.7 
percent in 1982 (World Bank, 1984, p. 8). Due to the failure 
of its voluntary adjustment program and to the closing of 
international markets to all Latin American debt, the Brazil-
ian government finally decided to turn to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in December of 1982. The closing of the 
international markets was the result of the Mexican debt 
moratorium in 1982 when Mexico was not able anymore to pay its 
external debt. After that, the creditors increased their 
pressure on Brazil to adopt a strict adjustment program 
supervised by the I~F (De A. Faria, 1988, p. 48). 
The austerity program now under the supervision of the 
IMF was continued. It consisted of higher exchange rates, a 
further reduction of domestic demand by diminishing private 
and public expenditures, and reduced investment. In addition, 
tax rates were increased. The current account deficit fell 
from US$ 16.3 bn in 1982 to US$ 6.8 bn in 1983 because of 
declining imports (See Table 7). 1 The real GDP, however, 
declined by 3.2 percent and the industrial sector by 6.8 
percent. Brazil was now able to continue the payments on its 
foreign debt. But the result was that investment declined and 
inflationary pressure grew strongly (Baer, 1989, pp. 114-
118) . 2 
1 Import reductions were due to the income effects of the 
recession and an increased domestic output of the import 
substitution industries. 
2 See Table 3. 
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Table 7 
Brazil's Foreign Trade and Current Account (In billions of 
US dollars) 
Exports Imports Trade Current 
Year (FOB) (FOB) Balance Account 
1969 2,311 -1,993 318 -312 
1970 2,739 -2,507 232 -583 
1971 2,904 -3,245 -341 -1,321 
1972 3,991 -4,235 -244 -1,489 
1973 6' 199 -6' 192 7 -1,688 
1974 7,951 -12,641 -4,690 
-7' 122 
1975 8,670 -12,169 -3,499 -6,751 
1976 10' 126 -12,278 -2, 152 -6' 133 
1977 12' 120 -12,023 97 -4,037 
1978 12,659 -13,683 -1,024 -5,927 
1979 15,244 -17,961 -2,717 -10,742 
1980 20, 132 -22,955 -2,823 -12,807 
1981 23,680 -22,086 1,594 -11,734 
1982 20,213 -19,396 817 -16,310 
1983 21,900 -15,428 6,472 -6,837 
1984 27,005 -13,937 13,068 45 
1985 25,639 -13,189 12,450 -650 
Note: From The Brazilian Economy (pp. 98-99, 202-203) by 
W. Baer, 1989, New York. 
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In 1984 the economy recovered and real GDP grew by 4.5 
percent. The growth rate in 1984 was influenced by rising 
exports that grew strongly in 1984. In 1985 real GDP grew at 
a rate of 8.3 percent. The IMF-supervised program improved the 
external accounts. An internal stabilization in the form of 
balanced growth and a reduction of the inflation rate, how-
ever, was not achieved. Instead of declining, the inflation 
rate remained between 211 percent and 235 percent from 1983 
to 1986 (Baer, 1989, pp. 117-118). 1 During the 1980s, multina-
tionals contributed strongly to the export sector which will 
be discussed in detail in the fourth chapter. 
As can be seen, the historical development of the Brazil-
ian economy is very complex. The policies toward multinatio-
nals often were strongly influenced by internal problems. Let 
us turn now to the phenomenon foreign direct investment and 
a specific analysis of its implications. First we shall 
approach it from a general point of view which will be done 
in chapter III; in chapter IV then we look specifically at the 
Brazilian case. 
1 See Table 3. 
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CHAPTER III 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Approach 
Foreign direct investment involves negotiations between 
at least two parties, the multinational corporation and the 
host country. This part of the study describes why foreign 
direct investment takes place, both from the perspective of 
the multinational corporation on the one hand, and from the 
host country on the other hand. 
Since a multinational corporation is a commercial 
institu~ion, there has to be some sort of incentive for its 
involvement abroad, but the host country also has to have some 
important reasons for accepting foreign direct investment. The 
benefits and the disadvantages attributable to multinational 
involvement will be discussed. 
The Perspective of the Multinational Corporation 
There are several different reasons for a company to 
invest directly in a foreign country, and these are revealed 
by opinion surveys in which MNC-managers were asked their 
prime reasons for investing abroad. 1 
1 Like for instance Gaston in 1973. 
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By far the most frequently given purpose was to increase 
the company's market share in order to secure profit (Connor, 
1977, p. 10). Securing raw materials was another important 
reason why investment flows into underdeveloped countries. 
Specific host-government policies, moreover, influenced the 
decision to invest. Increased trade barriers, for ex amp 1 e, 
sometimes would close the market to the MNC unless it built 
a production facility within the nation's boundaries. Another 
reason was direct investment incentives such as temporary 
exemption from taxes ( " tax ho 1 id a y s" ) . The surveys also 
revealed that la.w~r:_t~J3qr_ c;osts were not regarded significant 
in almost all cases (Connor, 1977, p. 10). 
Foreign direct investment offers the corporation diver-
sification opportunities which in turn reduce cyclical 
fluctuations. Thus higher stabi 1 i ty in earnings and cash-
f lows can be generated by offsetting negatively correlated 
booms and recessions among subsidiaries. This certainly is a 
benefit to the internationally active company (Gray, 1979, p. 
346). 
Some critical economists argue that MNCs are dysfunc-
tional because of "the imperfect market structures they find 
or create" (Connor, 1977, p. 219). This refers to the preva-
lence of oligopolies in foreign markets which provides greater 
opportunity for high profits especia 11 y in underdeve 1 oped 
countries (Gray, 1979, p. 346). 
When investing abroad, multinationals have to take risk 
35 
and uncertainty into account. There are two major types of 
uncertainty, one due to political factors and the other due 
to pur:::ely commercial factors. Corporations consider expro-
priation as a political uncertainty. Commercial uncertainty 
could be the development of an adverse market structure. 1 
These types of risk usually must be offset by the prospects 
of high rates of return, or the multinational will not invest 
(Gray, 1979, pp. 357-358). 
The Host Country's Perspective 
The Benefits 
Many underdeveloped countries invite foreign direct 
investment by multinationals because they expect a beneficial 
impact from this investment. Direct economic benefits will be 
considered in this section and indirect (social and political) 
benefits in the following section. 
1 An alternative to reduce the expropriation risk are 
joint-ventures in which the threat of being taken over is less 
because the government already (at least to a certain extent) 
controls the activities of the corporation and thus might not 
feel the need for a complete take-over. 
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Direct Economic Benefits 
Foreign direct investment will have an immediate posi-
tive impact on the balance-of-payments (capital account) of 
the host country. This is particularly the case during the 
initial stage when the real investment such as construction 
activities take place (Baer, 1989, p. 218). Many under-
developed countries have permanent foreign exchange shortages 
because manufactured goods are imported and there are only one 
or two ex ports. Thus demand for technol ogi ca 11 y advanced 
products and ca pi ta 1 goods grows faster than the foreign 
exchange earnings from the non-diversified exports which have 
a low income elasticity of demand (Kindleberger, 1977, p. 5). 
Foreign direct investment contributes to the solution of these 
balance-of-payments difficulties because formerly imported 
manufactured goods now are produced within the country· s 
boundaries. The need of foreign exchange for imports is 
diminished. Often foreign direct investment goes also into 
industries which export and thus earn foreign exchange 
(Connor, 1977, p. 59) . Even when no foreign ex change is 
immediately needed in a developing country, there is inade-
quate saving for investment purposes. Therefore, a stimula-
tio;./of the economy and growth is harder to obtain. Foreign 
direct investment contributes to the solution of the problem 
by providing ca pi ta 1 which might not have been accumu 1 ated 
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with only domestic savings (Swift, 1978, p. 67). 1 
Economic growth is also stimulated through foreign direct 
investment by the influx of highly productive technology and 
managerial skil 1. Investment by multinationals increase the 
productivity of labor and thereby enable the new industrial 
sectors to grow much faster than if the LDC had to develop its 
own technology (Tancer, 1976, p. 142). 
Resulting increases in GDP provide a larger tax base for 
the government which can be useful for specifically targeted 
public development projects (Connor, 1977, p. 59). 
The economic activities by MNCs generate employment for 
the local labor force in the MNC-subsidiary. In most under-
developed countries, manpower is relatively abundant (Baer, 
1 989 ' p. 223) . 
Another important benefit related to multinational 
investment which receives attention during FDI negotiations 
are the so-ca 11 ed "spread effects" which can considerab 1 y 
contribute to the development of the host country (Gray, 1979, 
p. 381). By creating forward and backward linkages to other 
industries, domestic production of goods can be stimulated. 
A backward linkage exists when the MNC-affiliate uses locally 
1 One reason saving is insufficient is low income. But 
even existing savings sometimes cannot be turned into capital 
accumu 1 at ion because of the absence of f inancia 1 interme-
diaries which serve as the link between savers and investors 
(Kindleberger, 1977, p. 5). Another very important reason for 
the lack of saving is "capital flight", a phenomenon in which 
1oca1 wea 1th ho 1 de rs invest part of their 1 iquid assets 
outside of the country in order to avoid risk or to obtain 
higher returns (Mueller, 1979, pp. 153-154). 
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manufactured production inputs (Frank, 1981, p. 89). This 
includes physical inputs that often need to have a certain 
quality thereby forcing the transfer- of technology and manage-
ment skills to local firms. Also, the employed local labor 
force must be trained in technical and administrative fields 
to have the necessary productivity. The importation of 
expatriate personnel usually is very expensive, so multi-
nationals in many cases turn to the employment and training 
of local talent (Baer, 1989, p. 223). 
A forward linkage is created when domestic firms use the 
products manufactured by the MNC-affiliate as inputs into 
other goods such as might occur in the further processing of 
semi-finished products. Domestic firms can also market fi-
nished goods produced by multinationals. Training of the 
domestic firm's employees in production technology and 
administration and marketing also occurs in forwardly-linked 
firms (Frank, 1981, p. 89). Aware of this highly beneficial 
potential for labor, developing host countries often require 
the investing firms to buy as many locally produced inputs as 
feasible and to train indigenous employees for many positions. 
It should be mentioned, however, that spread effects from 
foreign direct investment depend on the industry and locale 
of investment. Multinational subsidiaries in the manufacturing 
sector and even those in service sectors such as banks or 
hate 1 s need 1 abor- that has to be trained. If the MNC is in 
the extractive industry, on the other hand, the spread effects 
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are quite limited because there are no backward linkages. In 
the extractive industries production of the raw material re-
quires advanced technology and highly skilled, but little 
semi-skilled manpower. The processing of the extracted 
resource often takes place in a different country (Gray, 1979, 
p. 381). 
As a result of agreements between the MNC and the local 
government, often roads, railroads, or even ports are built 
or improved in the country. This contributes to a better 
infrastructure which in turn improves the conditions for 
progress in economic activity (Tancer, 1976, p. 27). 
Finally, export diversification will often occur because 
multinationals produce goods of a competitive quality at 
reasonable prices due to their high productivity. In addi-
tion, exportation of goods can be promoted using the wel 1 
developed global production and marketing network which 
multinationals own (Baer, 1989, p. 223). 
Social and Political Benefits 
Due to the generation of jobs and the training of local 
manpower multinationals create a new social class. In many 
developing countries the difference between the richest and 
the poorest citizens is enormous. Most of the population is 
poor and a few are rich. Manufacturing creates a new middle 
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class that consists of semi-skilled and even unskilled labor 
who receive high wages relative to local standards, and it 
contributes to a more even distribution of income. Social 
tensions can be reduced by the vertical social mobility 
provided by a middle class. 
There is also a political benefit from multinationals. 
Integration of the world economy is to a considerable degree 
attributable to foreign direct investment made by multina-
tionals; it can be a very important factor in reducing the 
danger of possible wars. Multinationals have understood that 
wars are destabilizing, destructive, and generally erode 
profits, so that it is in their principal interest to prevent 
them. Since they can use their power in the countries where 
they operate to achieve these interests, they become a force 
for world peace. 
After discussing the most important benefits of foreign 
direct investment in developing countries let us now focus on 
its disadvantageous features. 
The Costs 
As mentioned at the beginning of this study. direct 
investment by multinationals in developing countries is an 
issue over which the the currently available literature is 
strictly divided concerning the effects on the economic 
development of the relatively poor host nations. I shall 
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brief 1 y summarize the more important negative features of 
multinationals that some economists perceive. 
Direct Economic Costs 
A very often mentioned negative effect of MNCs is the 
impact on the host country's balance-of-payments in the long 
run. Once the initial investment period is over, the flow of 
ca pi ta 1 is of ten reversed because profits f 1 ow out of the 
country; this causes a drain on foreign exchange earnings and 
reserves. This drain occurs when the MNC repatriates its 
profit, royalties, and payments for technology that has been 
developed in the MNC's home country and rented to the affi-
liate (Gray, 1979, p. 385). These reversed flows are much 
smaller in their magnitude than the initial investment. But 
the reversed flows of funds happen frequently even when parts 
of the profits are reinvested in the subsidiary. Unless the 
multinational continues its foreign investment it is only a 
questio~ of time until the balance will become negative and 
from there on the deficit will increase (Swift, 1978, p.77). 
Aware of these implications, most Third World countries 
strictly limit or highly tax repatriation of profits. 
In order to circumvent regulations of this kind, the MNC 
on the other hand can turn to the use of transfer pricing to 
make hidden transfers of funds to the parent company. Inputs 
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bought abroad from the head corporation's affiliates or 
sometimes also from other firms are overpriced, but exports 
to one of these firms are made below the ·normal· price. 
Having shifted the earned profits elsewhere within the MNC, 
the result is that published profits in the subsidiary appear 
to be smaller than they actually are which provides additional 
benefits: reduced income taxes in the LDC. Furthermore, lower-
than-actua 1 profits earned by the MNC are advantageous for 
public relations. Transfer pricing is extremely difficult for 
the host country to uncover, to prove and to control (Baer, 
1989, p. 224) . 1 
Another problem is that multinational technology in LDCs 
is not appropriate to the country's conditions. Multinationals 
of ten use ca pi ta 1 intensive technology whereas most Third 
World countries like Brazil have a labor surplus. The rapid 
growth of the LDCs · 1 abor force is pr imar i 1 y in rura 1 areas 
where mu 1tinationa1 s do not operate (Kind 1 eberger, 1977, p. 5) . 
Employment effects, therefore, are not substantial. The 
development and application of this kind of labor using 
technology which fits the country's needs is unlikely to occur 
because the process is expensive. Even assuming away the 
financial argument, the MNC has to carry the greater risk 
associated with new and unexpected problems from the new 
1 Readers interested in the transfer pricing concept can 
chose from a large variety of different literature. For 
example, R. Hawkins, ed., The Economic Effects of Multina-
tional Corporations (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1979). 
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technology. In other words. the incentive to switch to labor 
using technology is too small and the risk too high (Baer, 
1989, p. 225). 
The technology problem could even generate or aggravate 
an unequal distribution of income. When capital replaces 
labor, then the generated income is received by a few capi-
tal owners and a few in the skilled labor force, but there 
are masses still unemployed (Mueller, 1979, p. 161). 
The question arises why multinationals don't undertake 
research and development (R&D) of technology that fits the 
host country's needs. Established R&D facilities in under-
developed countries usually are only used for quality control 
matters, not for fundamental technology research. Research and 
development is cheaper in a developed country where skilled 
labor is relatively inexpensive and support of universities 
and government exists. The multinational can squeeze out extra 
profit in form of technology payments, which is another reason 
for being in the country. Some argue that reliance on external 
R&D results in permanent dependency on foreign technology and 
permanent foreign exchange outflows for royalties (Baer, 1989, 
pp. 224-225). 1 
The presence of multinationals in a developing country 
1 Multinationals often refer to insufficient conditions 
in Third World countries which cannot provide enough support 
in the form of good libraries, universities, laboratories and 
so forth. Another reason sometimes stated by multinationals 
is the uncertainty in some LDCs regarding legal affairs such 
as patent laws and their enforcement. 
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like Brazil can easily lead to the denationalization of the 
local industr-y. Denationalization occur-s when the biggest 
corpor-ations in a countr-y become owned or control led by 
foreign persons or- institutions (Newfarmer and Mueller, 1975). 
The competitive advantage of multinationals often drives 
domestic pr-oducer-s fr-om the markets wher-e they have been 
dominant before or- at times they are taken over- by the MNC. 
This pr-ocess can be reinforced because of better- access 
of multinationals to loans. The domestic financial institu-
tions want to minimize the risk and maximize profits. Bank 
investment of deposits into foreign companies minimizes the 
default risk for- the bank because of the enormous financial 
basis multinationals have. Since there is already a scar-city 
of available funds relative to the demand for them, a certain 
number of sectors will not receive the desired loans. This 
process can prevent the gr-owth of the local fir-ms that are at 
a disadvantage when borrowimg from banks and encourage the 
expansion of multinationals even if domestic firms are more 
efficient (Mueller, 1979, p. 156). 1 
There is another impor-tant aspect. By investing in less 
developed countrie~, multinationals can distort consumption 
patterns of the domestic population. Since MNCs want to sell 
their often technologically advanced products in the count-
1 Furthermore since l n many underdeve 1 oped countries 
international banks hold lar-ge shar-es of the local deposits, 
a bias toward multinationals often develops because of risk 
factors. 
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ry, they emp 1 oy advertising campaigns and attractive credit 
plans. The average consumer s income. however, is often much 
too low to comfortably buy these supplied goods. Buying on 
credit and resulting indebtedness to purchase the relative 
expensive goods is a likely consequence. This not on 1 y 
distorts the consumption patterns but also decreases saving, 
capital accumulation, and eventually economic growth (Baer, 
1989, pp. 225-226). 
In summary, it is an open question whether a developing 
country can achieve an adequate return from FD I. Usua 11 y, 
underdeveloped countries are competing among each other for 
foreign investment because of their strong need to boost their 
industrial sectors. This sort of competition can result in a 
failure to drive a hard enough bargain with the multinational 
in the initial negotiations concerning taxation, repatriation 
of profits, and so on. The agreements are often too generous 
for the MNC, too extensive tax ho 1 idays for example, and 
reduce the benefits from foreign direct investment to the 
developing country (Gray, 1979, p. 382). 
Furthermore, there are some questions concerning the 
above mentioned spread effects. There is no doubt that they 
take place at least to some extent, but the crucial question 
is whether the mu 1 tina tiona 1 emphasizes the generation of 
spread effects. Does the multinational have that degree of 
social responsibility? Emphasis on spread effects in planning 
would be a tremendous benefit for the host country but it is 
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unlikely to occur (Gray, 1979, p. 406). There are several more 
arguments that could be made in this section. Those discussed 
seem to be the more important economic issues. We now examine 
social and political costs of foreign direct investment. 
Social and Political Costs 
The direct investment by multinationals can have nega-
tive implications on also political and social issues. A 
problem in dealing with MNCs frequently cited in the current 
literature is the existing lack of countervailing power in 
developing countries to control the operations of foreign 
companies. It is often the case that there is a lack of 
sufficiently trained civil servants to observe and ascertain 
whether the MNCs' activities comply with the existing commer-
cial and business laws. Often, taxation practices and laws in 
LDCs such as antitrust laws are inadequate to provide effec-
tive power in dealing with multinationals. Loss of political 
control over the MNC due to underdeveloped institutional 
structures is a possible result (Mueller, 1979, pp. 152-153). 
An indirect implication of the previously mentioned 
denationalization phenomenon could be a loss of political 
sovereignty by the local government over parts of the economy. 
Decisions concerning important industrial sectors of the 
economy are usually made abroad in the parent company with 
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little regard for the host country's economic development. 
Hence it could be possible that the government cannot influ-
ence its own economy (Gray, 1979, p. 382). Potential loss of 
sovereignty through political influence is a serious problem 
developing countries must deal with when foreign companies 
have control over crucial sectors of the economy. 
The arguments for and against foreign direct investment 
by mu 1 tina ti on a 1 corporations show the comp 1 ex i ty of this 
issue. Let us discuss now the empirically evident implications 
of foreign direct investment in Brazil. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN BRAZIL: 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Some Preliminary Remarks 
In this chapter, we summarize the consequences of fo-
reign direct investment in Brazi 1. The main problem is to 
attribute empirical conditions in the Brazilian economy and 
social system to the activities of multinationals. Of course, 
alternatively, the conditions could be the result of other 
complex, interacting factors. For example, is increased demand 
for foreign loans by the government and the resultant increa-
sed external indebtedness attributable to multinationals? 
Foreign companies are obviously involved, but is the foreign 
indebtedness directly attributable to them or was a complex 
of other factors responsible for the situation? It is likely 
that both the multinationals and other factors in combination 
were responsible. We will endeavour to focus on conditions 
that are directly attributable to multinationals. 
Since the biggest part of foreign direct investment is 
from U.S. multinationals many of the following arguments refer 
to them (Baer, 1989, p. 218). 1 
1 In 1986, 30 percent of the foreign capital was owned by 
U.S.-firms, followed by those from West ~erm~ny which held 15 
percent of the foreign capital. 
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Direct Economic Issues 
Economic Growth 
As stated earlier in this text, Brazil experienced re-
markable growth rates after World War II. This was especially 
the case in the !SI-period from 1947 to 1961 and during the 
"miracle years" from 1968 to 1974 (Baer, 1989, p. 66). 1 
From the 1930s to the 1980s multinationals from the 
United States concentrated more and more on manufacturing as 
their direct investment sector. In 1952 half of the foreign 
direct investment was undertaken in manufacturing; this share 
increased to 75 percent in 1986 (See Table 8). 
The manufacturing sectors in which much foreign direct 
investment was undertaken experienced high growth rates in the 
period from the 1970s to the 1980s. Remarkable expansion took 
place in the tobacco, electrical materials, rubber products, 
and pharmaceuticals industries (Baer, 1989, p. 215). These 
sectors had above-average rates of growth (See Table 9). 
Let us look now how much foreign direct investment 
contributed to economic growth. If increase in the gross 
domestic product is accepted as the sole or major criterion 
for economic development, then foreign direct investment was 
benef i cia 1 for Braz i 1 because rea 1 GDP increases by every 
1 During the ISI period, real GDP grew at an average rate 
of 5.8 percent and real industrial product at 9.6 percent per 
year. During the "miracle years", the average growth rate of 
real GDP was 10.9 percent. 
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piece of capital brought into the country (Swift, 1978, p.67). 
In order to determine FDI 's contribution, let us relate 
foreign direct investment to total capital formation. The 
percentage of FDI in total capital formation was on average 
4.3 percent from 1971 to 1983 (See Table 10). 
Table 8 
Sectoral Distribution of U.S. Investment in Brazil (1940-
1985, in Percentages of Total U.S. Investment) 
Sector 1929 1940 1952 1980 1985 
Manufacturing 23.7/. 29.2/. 50.6/. 68.0/. 74.7/. 
Petroleum 
(Distribution) 11.9/. 12.9/. 17.1/. 4.71. 3.0/. 
Public Utilities 50.0/. 46.7/. 14.9/. 7.3/. 4.5/. 
Other 14.4/. 11.2/. 17.4/. 20.0/. 17.8/. 
Total 100.0/. 100.0/. 100.0/. 100.0/. 100.01. 
Note: From The Brazilian Economy (p. 216) by W. Baer, 1989, 
New York. 
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Table 9 
Average Real Growth Rates of Manufacturing with Foreign 
Dominance (In Parenthesis: Share of foreign assets as per-
centaqe of total assets in 1985) 
Sector 1972-85 1972-75 1976-80 1981-85 
Manufacturing 
(Total) 4.6/. 8.2/. 7.3/. -0.8/. 
Tobacco (87%) 5.1/. 8.4% 5. 21. 2.4/. 
Electrical 
Materials (62%) 7.3% 14.3% 10.8% -1 . 21. 
Rubber 
Products (60%) 6 . 01. 14.7% 6.7% -1. 01. 
Pharmaceutical 
Products (57/.) 6.6% 19. 3/. 2.6% 1.3% 
Note: The shares of foreign assets was compiled from infor-
mation in "Quern e Quern na Economia Brasiliera", Visao, August 
1986. The sectoral growth rates were taken from Anuario 
Estatistico. Since the mentioned sectors might not have been 
defined identically, this table must be interpreted with 
caution. 
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Table 10 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Total Capital Formation 
(TCF) (1971-1983, in millions of US dollars and percentages) 
( 1 ) ( 2) ( 3) 
Foreign Total 
Direct Capital FDI/TCF 
Year Investment Formation (1):(3) 
1971 537 12,823 4.2/. 
1972 597 15,112 4.0/. 
1973 1,378 21,722 6.3/. 
1974 1,327 31,803 4.2/. 
1975 1,424 39,838 3.6/. 
1976 1,554 41,657 3.7/. 
1977 1,807 45,498 4.0/. 
1978 2,001 52,404 3.8/. 
1979 2,415 51,795 4.7/. 
1980 1,913 56,263 3. 4/. 
1981 2,526 58,428 4.3/. 
1982 2,922 60' 150 4.9/. 
1983 1,556 35,377 4.4/. 
Note: Foreign direct investment includes reinvestment by 
foreign companies, thus represent their total investment in 
Braz i 1 in that year. A 11 data are ex pressed in current 
exchange rates. From Anuario Estatistico_, and Balance-of-
Payments Statistics by the International Monetary Fund. 
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It becomes apparent in Table 10 that during the period 
from 1971 to 1983. foreign direct investment was rather 
insignificant in relation to total capital formation. Invest-
ment from other institutions such as government and Brazilian 
enterprise had by far bigger shares of the tot a 1 ca pi ta 1 
formation. Indeed. when regressions are run between growth of 
real GDP and foreign direct investment, the results are 
inconsistent. They either indicate the wrong sign or statisti-
cal insignificance between real GDP growth and FDI. 1 The 
reason for the inconsistency can be that, as stated above, the 
magnitude of FDI in relation to total investment was simply 
too small to affect real growth of the whole economy signi-
ficantly. 
The sectors in which foreign direct investment was made, 
however, experienced above average growth rates. Thus multi-
national investment was beneficial for economic growth in the 
sectors in which this investment took place. From an overall 
perspective, however, FDI's impact was rather small. Having 
discussed the effects of foreign direct investment on economic 
growth, let us now look at the employment effects. 
1 A regression between real GDP growth as the dependent 
variable, and FDI and government investment (GI) as indepen-
dent variables, resulted in the following equation: 
GDP= 13.64 - 0.00607 * FDI + 0.00024 *GI; the t-ratios were: 
-2.05 (FDI), 0.23 (GI); F-statistics was 7.0. When foreign 
loans (FL) and growth of the money supply (MS) were added to 
the 1 is t of independent var iab 1 es the equation 1 ooked as 
follows: GDP= 11.49 + 0.00441 * FDI - 0.00347 *GI + 0.00138 
*FL+ 0.097 *MS; the t-ratios were: 1.41 (FDI), -3.13 (GI), 
4.39 (FL), 3.99 (MS); F-statistics was 12.6. Data were taken 
from 1969 to 1985. 
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Since the magnitude of foreign direct investment rela-
tive to the total capital formation was insignificant from 
the 1970s to the 1980s, the conclusion can be drawn that newly 
created employment opportunities by multinationals were also 
insignificant in relation to total employment. Of course, 
multinationals provided job opportunities. But there is also 
the problem that throughout the post-World War II industriali-
zation period, FDI took place for the most part in capital 
intensive sectors. The industrial sector, which was a focus 
of FDI, failed to absorb the available supply of labor. During 
the period from 1950 to 1968, the growth rate of employment 
in industry was considerably below the production in industry. 
Industrial output grew at an average rate of 7.3 percent per 
year whereas employment in this sector increased by only 2.2 
percent (Prebish, 1970, p. 44). In the late 1960s, manufactur-
ing as a percentage of GDP was 25.8 percent, but manufacturing 
employment was only 8.2 percent of total employment. 
The reason why capital intensive instead of labor inten-
sive technology was used 1 ies in the original goal of the 
~.$'---.. E..~~f-~:t-. max imi za ti on. Since mu 1 tina ti on a 1 s operate on an 
international scale, they have easy access to various types 
of technology and no incentive to develop different production 
techniques (Swift, 1978, p. 86). In order to minimize costs 
as much as possible, multinationals use production facilities 
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that are no 1 anger competitive e 1 sewhere. but sti 11 have a 
relatively high productivity of labor (Gray, 1979, p. 381). 
Since the low employment effects of FDI are due to the techno-
logy used, it should be mentioned that the use of capital 
intensive technology is characteristic of manufacturing and 
has similar results when employed by other institutions such 
as state firms or domestic enterprise. Thus the insufficient 
creation of jobs is only indirectly attributable to multina-
tional corporations themselves. 
Brazil tried to maximize employment effects by requir-
ing all industrial facilities in the country to have at least 
66 percent local employees in their total staff. There were 
no requirements which specified that indigenous employees were 
to be used as executives, white collar employees or workers 
(Garland, 1971, pp. 146-147). 
As Tancer claims (1976), there is a general unwilling-
ness to hire the local labor force in relatively high adminis-
trative positions among the MNCs in Brazil. In spite of high 
costs, the importation of highly skilled technicians and 
managers from the home country is preferred. Foreign execu-
tives justify their decisions by arguing that imported 
management understand the multinational's methods of opera-
tion better and thus are more capable of dealing with the high 
standard performance in their firms than are local management. 
Furthermore, some multinational management has expressed fear 
that host-country employees in high administrative positions 
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could leave the company and operate independently, thus 
creating a potential rival to the multinational (Gray, 1979, 
p. 384). 
In summary, employment effects of foreign direct in-
vestment in Brazil are relatively small because of FDI's 
relative magnitude and the use of capital intensive techno-
1 ogy. Emp 1 oyed indigenous 1 abor force seems to have on 1 y 
restricted access to higher administrative positions. After 
discussing the employment effects, we now will examine how 
multinationals affected the distribution of income. 
Distribution of Income 
As mentioned in the second chapter, the income distri-
bution in Brazil is highly unequal. Inequality is apparent 
geographically as well as among income groups. Because the 
income of the wealthiest 20 percent is so much higher than 
that of the other 80 percent, two entirely different life-
s ty 1 es are apparent. The first is of the masses who cannot 
afford to buy industr ia 1 products such as au tomobi 1 es, re-
frigerators or even bicycles. The second is of the upper class 
which is about equal to· upper middle class in a western 
industrialized country like the United States (Swift, 1978, 
pp. 93, 95}. 
Let's focus on how multinationals affect the income 
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distr-ibution in Br-azil. The cr-ucial element is. again, the 
use of r-ather- capital intensive technology. The capital labor-
r-atio in MNC-subsidiar-ies is much higher- than in the traditio-
nal sector-s. The r-ealized income of a for-eign cor-por-ation is 
distr-ibuted only among a few, the capital owner-s and the 
emp 1 oyees. Even with higher- wages in these indus tr- ies a 
concentr-ation of income is almost inevitable due to these 
aspects (Baer, 1989, p. 89). Of cour-se. this is an often 
stated argument when industrialization occurs. The question 
to be asked is whether multinationals contributed to the 
problem or not. The use of capital intensive technology by_ 
multinationals is in fact supportive to an increasing concen-
tration of income. But there ar-e more aspects to be mentioned. 
During the boom years in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
there was a strong demand incr-ease by multinationals for 
skilled labor- which could not be satisfied. Increasing 
effective demand for- technicians led to an enor-mous increase 
in their r-elative income and contributed to the inequality of 
income r-ather- than to its solution. A better education and 
tr-aining system, perhaps supported by multinationals, would 
have helped to deer-ease this shortage (Baer-, 1989, p. 89). 
Wages paid by multinationals to indigenous employees are 
usu a 11 y higher than those paid by 1oca1 companies. This is 
counteracted, however, by the fact that productivity of labor 
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in foreign firms is much higher than that in lo ca 1 firms. 1 
This uncovers another aspect how multinationals contribute to 
the concentration of wealth among capital owners (Baer, 1989, 
p. 232). 
Those who recognize the unequal distribution of income 
but still support the process that has led to it often refer 
to the so-called "trickle-down" theory.'" "Eventually, with 
rising per capita income, it will be possible for the lowest 
income groups to afford more expensive goods." (Swift, 1978, 
p. 76). The theory may apply in the long run, but it should 
be asked if a slower but more even growth would not provide 
the masses with more benefits. After several decades of 
exceptional growth, the standard of living of the vast 
majority has barely improved. Thus the evidence of the 
"trickle-down" theory during the industrialization period is 
highly questionable (Swift, 1978, p. 77). 
The problem is that there seems to be no commercial 
incentive for multinationals to support a more balanced 
growth. The 22 million elite who receive 63 percent of the 
1 In 1972 the wages paid by foreign companies were 30 
percent higher whereas the productivity of labor in foreign 
companies was on average 50 percent higher than in domestic 
firms. 
2 The "trickle-down 11 theory is that increasing demand by 
higher income groups wi 11 lead to the employment of more 
workers. Family income will rise, even when real wages fall, 
because other family members can work. With higher production, 
there is potential for economies of scale lowering the costs 
per unit. The products become affordable for lower income 
groups (Swift, 1978, p. 77). 
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income are able to keep the economy growing and thus give the 
MNCs no reason for a strategy change (Baer. 1989. p. 88). 
Due to low income, the bottom two thirds of the income 
receivers are more or less excluded from purchasing durable 
consumer goods produced by multinationals. Let us examine how 
the consumption patterns of the population were affected by 
the presence of multinationals. 
Composition of GDP - Distortion of Consumption Patterns 
Multinational corporations in Brazil mainly produce 
"sophisticated, highly designed, and elaborately packaged 
goods" (Frank, 1981, p. 73). These products, such as refr iger-
ators, television sets, electric appliances and especially 
automobiles are useless for the needs of the mostly poor rural 
masses who demand basic consumer goods such as food or 
clothes. Exactly in the industries in which the sophisticated 
goods were manufactured, multinationals operated most heavi-
ly. Between 1964 and 1970, the per capita production of basic 
consumer goods in Braz i 1 changed in significant 1 y. ·1 On the 
other hand, the yearly average per capita production of highly 
sophisticated goods grew rapidly during that period: automobi-
les by 11.7 percent; air conditioning by 75 percent; household 
1 The production even decreased: food by 0.8 percent; 
textiles by 2.5 percent; clothing by 0.6 percent. 
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electric appliances by 27 percent; refrigerators by 30 percent 
(Serra, 1973, pp. 117-119). 
Some Brazilian economists, moreover, like Celso Furtado 
claim that multinationals have severely influenced the 
consumption pattern of the population, especially through 
advertising. They accuse the MNCs of having distorted the 
demand profile of the citizens who purchase goods they would 
not have bought without the employed marketing tools (Baer, 
1989, p. 91). Obviously, it is hard to come up with any kind 
of proof that shows this connection. It is a fact, however, 
that multinationals from the United States transfer their 
marketing techniques,including advertising, to their affili-
ates in Brazil. This happens in spite of entirely different 
cultures, levels and distribution of income, and mass media 
systems. Connor and Mueller (1977) showed that heavy adver-
tising is one way used by the multinationals to achieve 
relatively high profits. Looking at 176 US-multinationals in 
1972, the after tax profits as a percentage of equity capi-
tal were on average 16.1 percent. These profits were consi-
derably higher than those the same firms realized regarding 
their total (domestic and foreign) operations. But it should 
be kept in mind that high profits generally are a compensa-
tion for higher risk in developing countries. 
Another problem in this context is that most of the 
competitors are also multinationals which use the same 
marketing concepts. Hence, it is not very likely that MNC-
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subsidiaries are going to change their sales strategies due 
to fear of losing market shares (Connor, 1977, p. 115). 
After the discussion of the effects of foreign direct 
investment on consumption patterns, we now will examine the 
consequences of foreign direct investment on foreign trade 
and the balance-of-payments of Brazil. 
Foreign Trade and Balance-of-Payments 
The impact of foreign direct investment on the balance-
of-payments is very difficult to establish. The balance-of-
payments data of the post-WW II period, however, should allow 
some generalization. There are four different ways in which 
MNCs are involved in the flow of funds into and out of Brazil. 
The inflow of capital due to foreign direct investment; 
capital and service payments abroad (profits, interests, and 
royalties); imports of capital goods and production inputs; 
exports of products. 
Let us start with the direct impact of FDI on Brazil's 
balance-of-payments. Foreign direct investment was signif i-
cant from about 1970 on. How was the impact of foreign direct 
investment relative to the balance-of-payments needs of 
Brazil? In Table 11, the foreign exchange needs are summed up 
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under "foreign exchange outflow" . 1 The deficits have to be 
covered by the inflow of either foreign direct investment or 
foreign loans. Looking at Table 11, it becomes evident that 
the foreign ex change needs of Braz i 1 were insufficient 1 y 
covered by foreign direct investment which on average was 11.7 
percent of the foreign exchange needs between 1969 and 1985. 
The inflow of foreign loans which 11-Jere on average 102.4 
percent of the foreign exchange needs played a by far more 
important ro 1 e providing foreign ex change. Foreign di re ct 
investment was counteracted by profit repayments during that 
time. 
Capital repayment and service payments abroad created a 
dangerous balance-of-payments position for Brazil in the early 
1960s. In order to discourage these payments, the goverment 
began to tax repatriated profits after 1964. It is question-
able, however, if the reported profit remittances represented 
their real amounts. The methods used to circumvent restric-
tions on profit remittances, as Swift claimed (1978), were 
hidden transfers in the form of royal ties or by transfer-
pricing. As mentioned earlier, this behaviour is hard to 
prove. It should be said, however, that in the early 1980s 
about 50 percent of the exports of MNCs went to affiliates or 
to the head company. This figure was even higher in some 
1 "Net foreign exchange outflow" includes the trade 
balance, the service balance (thus also profit remittances and 
interest payments), unilateral payments and the amortization 
of foreign loans. Changes of international reserves are not 
considered. 
63 
Table 11 
Foreign Exchange (FX) Outflows, Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI), and Foreign Loans (1960-1985, in millions of US dollars 
and percentages) 
( 1 ) ( 2) ( 3) ( 4) ( 5) 
Share of Share of 
Net Net FX Outflow FX Outflow 
Foreign Foreign covered Net covered 
Exchange Direct by FDI Foreign by Loans 
Year Outflow Investment (2):(1) Loans (4):(1) 
1960 -895 99 ll'l. 348 39% 
1963 -478 30 6% 250 52% 
1966 -296 74 25% 508 172% 
1969 -774 189 24% 1201 155% 
1970 -1234 146 12% 1510 122% 
1971 -2157 189 9% 2523 117% 
1972 -2691 337 13% 4300 160% 
1973 -3361 977 29% 4495 134% 
1974 -9042 945 ll'l. 6891 76% 
1975 -8871 1006 ll'l. 6530 74% 
1976 -9021 1010 ll'l. 8971 100/. 
1977 -8097 810 10% 8424 104/. 
1978 -11097 906 8% 13632 123% 
1979 -17127 1491 9% 11228 66% 
1980 -15104 1120 7% 10596 70% 
1981 -18170 1585 9% 15632 86% 
1982 -23262 991 4% 12515 54 'l. 
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Table 11 (continued) 
( 1 ) ( 2) ( 3) ( 4 ) ( 5) 
Share of Share of 
Net Net FX Outflow FX Outflow 
Foreign Foreign covered Net covered 
Exchange Direct by FDI Foreign by Loans 
Year Outflow Investment (2):(1) Loans (4):(1) 
1983 -8757 664 81.. 8153 93/. 
1984 -6423 1047 16/. 8536 133/. 
1985 -9540 800 81.. 7010 74/. 
Note: Net foreign exchange outflow includes the current 
account plus amortization payments and describes the foreign 
exchange needs in that year. From The Brazilian Economy (pp. 
98-99, 202-203) by W. Baer, 1989, New York. 
sectors such as transport equipment where it was 88 percent, 
and technical and scientific instruments where it was 100 
percent (Baer, 1989, p. 208). 1 Companies that more or less 
admitted the use of this concept argued that it was only done 
to avoid unjustified restrictions regarding royalties, techno-
logy payments, and profit repatriations. If the restrictions 
had remained within reasonable frontiers, the multinationals 
1 Often there were tie-in clauses agreed by the govern-
ment and multinationals. They require the purchase of inputs 
from a subsidiary of the same firm in another part of the 
world. Thus transfer-pricing could easily be performed by the 
MNC with the government's blessing (Swift, 1978, p. 80). 
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argued, then transfer-pricing would not have occurred (Frank, 
1981, p. 154). This case shows how different goals among 
multinationals and Brazil's development can lead to conflicts 
which are difficult to solve. 
The problem of technology payments and royalties has a 
similar nature. During the early 1960s, the public belief grew 
that these payments were used in order to circumvent the 
limitations on profit remittances. Since that time the payment 
of royalties is only allowed when a foreign firm controls less 
than 50 percent of the ca pi ta 1 stock in Braz i 1. Techno 1 og'f 
payments are under severe scrutiny and restriction. When 
payments are allowed, not more than 5 percent of gross sales 
may be paid (Baer, 1989, p. 229). 
Many multinationals on the other hand said that these 
payments were indispensable to cover the costs of centralized 
R&D activities in the parent company. They complained that the 
Brazilian government would underestimate these costs. After 
implementing the policy, only few MNC-affiliates made techno-
logy payments and most of them were quite low (Connor, 1977, 
p. 115). 
Did multinationals affect Brazil's foreign trade adver-
sely? Let us first consider imports. Part of the !SI-strategy 
in the 1950s and early 1960s was to supply the products that 
had been previously imported. During that period, however, it 
became apparent that the dependence on imports was trans-
ferred from final products to the inputs needed to make them 
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such as ca pi ta 1 , techno 1 ogy, or ski 11 ed 1 abor. The importa-
tion of machinery as well as production inputs such as semi-
finished products and even raw materials that were not 
available in Brazil became necessary for growth and develop-
ment (Swift, 1978, pp. 124-125). 1 
The importation of capital and intermediate goods by 
Brazilian enterprises and multinationals was high throughout 
the period from 1948 to 1972. Capital and intermediate goods 
made up between 60 percent and 85 percent of imports. After 
the oil shock in 1973, the percentage of crude oil and deriva-
tives increased, and the ability to import capital goods was 
limited. Together, these items formed by far the biggest part 
of the imports during the post-WW II period (Baer, 1989, 
p. 200) . 
It would be incorrect to say that the imports by multi-
nationals were completely responsible for the balance-of-
payments problems. Rather the !SI-strategy as a whole in which 
multinationals were just one among many other elements, is the 
cause for these difficulties. Let us look now at the contribu-
tion of multinationals to exports. 
During the 1980s, foreign firms strongly supported the 
ex port a ti on of goods. This, however, was not just due to 
goodwi 11. Many rewards by the government provided strong 
incentives to export. In 1982, there were 248 multinationals 
1 Imported raw materials 
industry, copper, tin, zinc, and 
p. 209). 
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were: Coal for 
chemicals (Baer, 
the steel 
1989, 
among Br-azil's 827 expor-ting companies. Multinationals 
e>:ported 23 percent pr imar-y goods, 34 per-cent semimanufac-
tured goods, and 43 percent manufactur-ed products. 
Thirty per-cent of the pr-imary goods exports, 43 percent 
of the semimanufactured, and 40 percent of the manufactured 
goods exports were attributable to multinationals. In some 
industries, multinationals wer-e almost exclusively respon-
sible for exports of goods from their- sector- (Baer, 1989, 
p. 208). 1 It should be taken into consideration that during 
the 1981-1983 recession, many compensated their decreasing 
sales by exports. The most remarkable success in the 1980s 
took place in the automobile industry in which sales abroad 
were between US$ 1.5 bn and 2.1 bn (Baer, 1989, p. 234). 
The impact of foreign direct investment on the balance-
of-payments is a very complex issue, and it is very hard to 
make a general conclusion. It seems useful to look seperate-
ly at the different consequences of FDI on Brazil's external 
accounts in order to determine if the expectations were ful-
filled. Let us summarize them. The direct impact of foreign 
direct investment on the balance-of-payments was quite low. 
Throughout the post WW II period, the importation of machin-
ery and intermediate goods was high. This, however, was more 
attributable to the !SI-strategy as a whole rather than being 
1 Electronic parts & equipment (99.5 percent), automobile 
parts (60 percent), chemicals & pharmaceuticals (79 percent), 
automobiles, trucks and buses (89 percent), tires (100 
percent). 
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the result of foreign direct investment. Finally, from the 
late 1970s on, multinationals contributed substantially to the 
exports from Brazil. 
An issue which indirectly affects Brazil's external ac-
counts, are the research and development activities of multi-
nationals. They will be discussed in the next section. 
Research and Development (R&D} and Technology Licensing~ 
The Brazilian government wants multinationals to develop 
their technology within the country· s boundaries and not 
abroad in the parent company. There are three major reasons 
for this attitude. First, the use of imported technology 
results in the outflow of funds via technology payments, thus 
creating a burden on the balance-of-payments (Baer, 1989, 
p. 209). Second, research and development in a foreign country 
could lead to a permanent dependence upon the importation of 
technology. Third, the domestic labor force could experience 
an increase in know-how and productivity if R&D were under-
taken in Brazil (Gray, 1979, p. 406). 
It becomes more and more evident, however, that multi-
nationals concentrate their activities in this field in their 
home countries. They argue that there is not sufficiently 
qualified personnel available in Brazil. Furthermore, central-
ized R&D in the parent company has an enormous advantage due 
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to economies of scale (Frank, 1981, p. 153). 
Until today many Brazilian firms have access to techno-
logy only by buying the patents from multinationals via 
licensing. The role of patents is most significant in the 
sectors in which actual production costs are relatively low 
compared to R&D for these products as in chemicals or phar-
maceuticals. In order to ensure coverage of total costs, the 
multinational has the options to keep a patent monopoly on the 
technology, or to sell it to other market participants. 
Selling to other market participants would increase 
productivity of domestic firms. The local firms complain about 
excessive prices charged by foreign companies and the often 
restrictive conditions of the agreements. Multinationals, on 
the other hand, do not share the opinion that the licensing 
fees are overpriced. Corporations, particularly from France 
and West Germany, express the view that many less developed 
countries like Brazil don't see the real costs of technology. 
They claim that Brazilians apply the philosophy that techno-
logy is "a part of the common heritage of mankind" (Frank, 
1981, p. 81). Disgreements like this increase fear of being 
exploited by the multinationals. As can be seen, the access 
of Brazil to technology is a difficult issue which is far from 
being solved. Let us examine now if multinationals contributed 
to one of Brazil's most severe economic problems, its external 
indebtedness. 
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As it could be observed in the second chapter, Brazil's 
foreign indebtedness is among the highest in the world. How 
multinationals are involved in this problem is important to 
Brazil's development. 
Unfortunately, the data published by Brazil's Central 
Bank do not show a classification of international borrowers. 
There are, however, some indications that provide information 
about foreign indebtedness of MNCs. As stated earlier, multi-
nationals tend to be more highly indebted than domestic 
companies. On the other hand, they have no access to long-
term credit provided by official institutions. Baer claims 
(1989) that multinationals as well as state enterprises 
borrowed substantial amounts from abroad, but there is little 
evidence to judge by. Another issue regarding which empirical 
evidence is hard to obtain is the question of the contribution 
of multinationals to Brazil's high inflation rates. 
Inflation 
Brazil has had high inflation rates throughout the entire 
post-WW II era. The causes of high inflation are not complete-
ly evident, and economists are divided regarding them. On the 
other hand, Latin American countries have experienced very 
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high inflation rates, and Latin American countries used 
simi 1 ar industr i a 1 i za ti on strategies; does this mean their 
similar strategies are connected with high rates of infla-
tion? Unfortunately, no clear answer is available yet because 
of lack of data (Swift, 1978, p. 121). However, theoretically, 
avoidance of foreign direct investment may aggravate the 
inflation problem. Public investment as opposed to foreign 
direct investment would have been carried out with bond or 
money expansion due to lack of tax revenues. Additionally, the 
lack of savings results in the only solution, besides foreign 
loans, to be monetary expansion which is a likely cause of 
inflation. 
The role of foreign direct investment in regard to 
Brazil's inflation is a very complex issue which has not been 
completely revealed. 
Denationalization 
The policies encouraging foreign direct investments in 
Brazil in the post-WW II period have led to a situation where 
several of the most dynamic sectors of the economy are under 
control of foreigners. In 1985 there were several industrial 
sectors that were dominated by foreign firms with shares in 
total sales greater than 50 percent. The most significant 
dominance was in the production of au tomobi 1 es with 99. 9 
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percent produced by foreign firms and pharmaceu ti ca 1 s with 
85.8 percent (See Table 12). 
Table 12 
Market Shares of Foreign Firms .ln Indus tr ia 1 Sectors with 
Foreign Dominance (1985, in percentages of total sales) 
Marketshare 
Sector of Foreign Firms 
Automobile assembly 99.9% 
Pharmaceuticals 85.8% 
Hygienic & cleaning 
products 72.8% 
Communications & 
office products 66.2% 
Plastics & rubber 
products 64.4% 
Beverages & tobacco 61.41.. 
Petroleum distribution 57.1% 
Automotive parts 55.3% 
Note: Each sector includes the 20 largest firms. From The 
Brazilian Economy (p. 221) by W. Baer, 1989, New York. 
The increase of denationalization can be illustrated by 
the fact that 25 years before in 1960 the share in these 
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sectors was smaller: automobiles 69 percent, pharmaceuticals 
62 percent (Swift, 1978, p. 64). 1 Many foreign investors have 
entered the Brazilian economy by acquiring existing local 
firms. Hence, they did not increase the total capital stock, 
only the foreign share of it (See Table 13). 
Table 13 
Percentage of US-manufacturing affiliates established in 
Brazil by acquisition (1945-1972): 
Year 
1946-50: 
1951-55: 
1956-60: 
1961-65: 
1966-70: 
1971-72: 
US multinationals 
established by 
Acquisition 
91. 
221. 
33/. 
38/. 
521. 
611. 
Note: From Economic Development in Latin America (p. 68) by 
J. Swift, 1978, New York. 
Only a few of these mergers were made because the 
Brazilian companies were failing. Connor (1977) found out that 
1 Since the sources of this information are not identi-
cal, they have to be interpreted with caution. 
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between 1945 and 1975. 75 percent of the firms were profitable 
in the year before being acquired and two thirds were making 
high profits, earning more than 9 percent after tax profits 
on their assets (Connor, 1977, p. 75). 
Another aspect is of concern. Multinational indebtedness 
is on average considerably higher than that of local competi-
tors. Looking at those with comparab 1 e assets, it has been 
shown that MNCs are on average 50 percent to 150 percent more 
highly indebted than 1oca1 firms. That indicates that they 
receive most of the available financial capital for their 
activities whereas domestic companies get little (Mueller, 
1979, p. 164). 
There is the aspect of the political power. Particular-
ly in the post-1973 era, Brazil depended heavily on foreign 
capital. The bargaining power of foreign companies began to 
increase since they contributed enormously to the continua-
tion of economic growth (Baer, 1989, p. 211). It seems very 
likely that these circumstances influenced agreements between 
the government and the MNCs such as labor policies or profit 
remittance laws. Any empirical evidence for reciprocal bar-
gaining, however, is nearly impossible to obtain. Denatio-
nalization can be carried even further. 
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Indirectly Related (Social and Political) Issues 
New Dependence 
Some economists claim that Latin American countries may 
have escaped old fashioned colonial ism and government by a 
central authority, but they find themselves in a new form of 
dependence and control by multinational corporations. Poli-
ti ca 1 sovereignty does not exist under this new state of 
affairs. It should be remembered, hol-'-Jever, that Brazil 
deliberately attracted foreign direct investment. Brazil's 
choice was fast growth or political independence, and it chose 
fast growth. It can be stated as a negative feature that, how-
ever, cannot be held against multinationals (Gray, 1979, 
p. 402). After looking at more outward oriented political 
consequences, we now will focus on internal political implica-
tions. 
Internal Political Implications 
The growing concentration of income among relatively few 
rich people is considered a major cause for the increasing 
frustration among the masses in Brazil. Already in the 1950s 
and 1960s the problem had become a social and political issue. 
Increasing growth rates were accompanied by increasing social 
unease due to the gap betvJeen incomes of the rich and the 
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poor. This was, among other issues, a cause of the military 
coup and complete control of the press after 1964 (Swift, 
1978, p. 72). Granted, the growing inequality was a result of 
the development strategy as a whole. However, multinationals 
contributed, as has been shown earlier, to the income prob-
lem and must share the responsibility for the social unrest. 
Having discussed the most apparent, empirically evident 
imp 1 i cations of foreign di re ct investment in Braz i 1, 1 et us 
now make some conclusions. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Clearly, foreign direct investment as part of a develop-
ment strategy has major social, economic, and political impli-
cations. The Brazilian case reveals that foreign direct 
investment by multinational corporations has many beneficial 
aspects for economic development of the host country. Foreign 
direct investment brought internationally competitive industry 
to Braz i 1. By that the economy was modernized and ex port 
diversification was achieved. Furthermore, domestic firms have 
access to advanced technology via licensing. However, foreign 
direct investment in Brazil created also many difficulties. 
One problem is the permanent outflow of foreign exchange due 
to capital and technology payments. Furthermore, multinatio-
nals do not contribute to a more equal distribution of income. 
The consumption patterns of the mostly poor population seem 
to be distorted by multinationals. Moreover, Brazil has only 
limited control over the sectors which are dominated by 
multinationals since important decisions are made in the MNC 
headquarters abroad. 
Whether FDI was advantageous or disadvantageous for 
Brazil's economic development is very hard to answer because 
there are convincing arguments on both sides. It is not 
obvious whether the strategy was a success or a failure in 
simp 1 y economic terms. Weighing of benefits and cos ts of 
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multinationals even in an economic sense is subjective since 
many of the benefits and costs are currently not measureable. 
A second problem is that we do not know how the economy 
would develop without the involvement of multinationals. In 
order to evaluate the net benefits from FDI. it would be 
necessary to compare the status quo with how Brazil would look 
like with only domestic investment and institutions. Since we 
cannot go back in time and try a different strategy, a 11 
statements about the Brazilian development without multinatio-
nals are highly hypothetical. A clear answer to the original 
question is, therefore, not possible. 
But the Braz i 1 ian experience can be very va 1 uabl e for 
other countries. Negative aspects of foreign direct invest-
ment in Brazil can be prevented by intelligent regulation or 
incentives. In order to avoid balance-of-payments difficult-
ies, for example, LDCs could tax profit remittances instead 
of disallowing them. As became apparent in Brazil in the 1960s 
and 1970s, taxation of profit remittances does not discourage 
foreign direct investment. LDCs also could introduce export 
promoting incentives. In order to achieve more substantial 
employment effects, the host country could establish incen-
tives which promote the use of labor instead of capital. When 
the host country desires more research and development, it can 
actively encourage it, either financially or by support from 
local institutions such as universities, laboratories and so 
forth. Since multinationals have very similar goals and 
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methods, this experience can be used by other less developed 
countries and turned into an advantage. 
It is clear that in order to influence the operations of 
multinationals positively, careful bargaining at the point of 
entry is required. Once the company is firmly established in 
the host country's economy, it may be impossible to modify 
basic agreements. 
Because there is an understandable fear by less deve-
1 oped countries of 1 osing foreign investment, many of them 
are confronted with bargaining situations which they cannot 
handle without support from another institution. Often the 
supervision by a third party such as a United Nations orga-
nization is helpful. Institutions like the World Bank or the 
International Monetary Fund are often the best ones to work 
out and carry out initial agreements. These organizations were 
able to gain valuable experience for more than four decades. 
By cooperating with them, in te 11 igen t regu 1 a tions to avoid 
conflicts of interests can be found much more easily. De-
tailed regulations upon which the host country and the multi-
na t ion a 1 have to agree before the direct investment takes 
place, can improve the chances for successful cooperation 
considerably. 
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